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The Good Samaritan and Admiralty: A
Parable of a Statute Lost at Sea
BY PATRICK J. LONGt
[A] certain lawyer stood up, and tempted him, saying, Master,
what shall I do to inherit eternal life?
He said unto him, What is written in the law? how readest thou?
And he answering said, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all
thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and
with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself.
And he said unto him, Thou hast answered right: this do, and thou
shalt live.
But he, willing to justify himself, said unto Jesus, And who is my
neighbour?
And Jesus answering said, A certain man went down from Jeru-
salem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, which stripped him of his
raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead.
And by chance there came down a certain priest that way: and
when he saw him, he passed by on the other side.
And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked
on him, and passed by on the other side.
But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was: and
when he saw him, he had compassion on him.
And went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and
wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn,
and took care of him.
And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two pence, and
gave them to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and
whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay
thee.'
t J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, 2000; A.B., Har-
vard College, 1989. Thank you to Professor Fred Konefsky for all his guidance
and encouragement. I also thank my family, without whom I would be lost at
sea. This article is for them.
1. Luke 10:25-35 (King James).
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With purely moral obligations the law does not deal. For example,
the priest and Levite who passed by on the other side were not, it
is supposed, liable at law for the continued suffering of the man
who fell among thieves, which they might, and morally ought to
have, prevented or relieved.
2
INTRODUCTION
The schooner Emblem, with a crew of six and five pas-
sengers, sailed from Apalachicola, Maine, for Havana, Cuba
on March 18, 1840.' As dawn broke one week later, she was
struck by a squall.4 This storm knocked her on her beam-
ends, where she wallowed for eight hours.5 Finally, when
the waterlogged sails snapped her masts, she righted her-
self.6 The storm pelted the ship continually, as the wind
sent waves crashing over the deck.' The crew and the pas-
sengers lashed themselves to the stubs of the masts or to
the hatches to keep from being washed overboard.8 For four
straight days,
the weather was boisterous, and the waves constantly broke over
the wreck and the heads of the persons on board, so that they were
constantly kept wet, lashed to the wreck... and without food or
drink .... [Olne after another of this sad company, as their
strength became exhausted and the powers of nature failed, were
loosened from their holdings and washed into the deep. The mas-
ter of the vessel expired in the evening after the disaster, and five
others, before they were relieved.9
One of the four survivors, a Mrs. Judah, "saw her hus-
band and her two children successively swept from the
deck, by the violence of the waves, and buried in the
ocean."' Eventually, the Charles Miller came to the Em-
blem's rescue and saved those who were left."
What is most tragic about this case is that it all took
place within sight of land, in one of the busiest shipping
2. Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1898).
3. See The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611, 611 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4434).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id.
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lanes in the country.12 While the crew and passengers of the
Emblem suffered, ships constantly passed within sight.
Mrs. Judah
saw five vessels pass them on the first day, and seven on the sec-
ond; and was informed by one of the crew, that twenty-three, in
all, were in sight, at different times, from the wreck .... Some of
them came so near, that the persons on board could be plainly and
distinctly seen ....
Not one came to their relief.'4
The callousness of these passersby might offend our
sense of morality. We may feel a duty to help our fellow
man when he is at risk for his life. We may honor those who
do rescue those in danger. But do we feel comfortable hold-
ing someone criminally or civilly liable for not coming to the
aid of one in need? Can we imprison someone for not being
a Good Samaritan?
Under the common law, the answer is no. Traditional
tort principles refuse to impute liability to an individual
merely for failing to help a stranger. There must be some
kind of relationship between the two for duty to inure. Un-
der admiralty law, however, it appears that we can hold
someone liable for the injuries caused by a refusal to aid.
Title 46, Section 2304 of the United States Code states that
"[A] master or individual in charge of a vessel shall render
assistance to any individual found at sea in danger of being
lost.... 15 The statute imposes a maximum penalty of two
years in prison or a fine of $1000, or both, for its violation. 6
This Note will trace the origin of this statute and examine
how the courts have interpreted it.
This statute has a dubious parentage-there is no
precedent for it in admiralty law or in common law. Moreo-
ver, despite the statute's lack of ambiguity, courts have
proved very reluctant to impose this duty on masters or
their owners. It has not been amended since its passage in
1912.'1 Scholars rarely examine it, and it is not enforced.
12. See id. at 612.
13. Id. at 611.
14. See id.
15. 46 U.S.C. § 2304 (1994).
16. See id.
17. Although the statute was slightly modified in 1983, there was no change
to its substance. See 46 U.S.C.S. § 2304 (1998).
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Unknown, unprecedented, unenforced. The law of the
Good Samaritan is a statute lost at sea. Like an abandoned
vessel adrift on the ocean, this derelict law may be a hazard
to navigation.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE
In 1885, on the initiative of the Belgian government,
the first international congress dedicated to commercial law
was held in Antwerp. 8 This congress, and its successor in
1888, dealt with, among other things, the admiralty sub-
jects of salvage and collisions." Consequently, the Comite
Maritime International was founded in 1897.7 The Comite
organized two further conferences, one in Paris in 1900 and
one in Hamburg in 1902.21 At these conferences, the repre-
sentatives drafted two conventions, one relating to salvage,
the other relating to collisions.22 During four sessions be-
ginning in Brussels in 1905 through 1910, these drafts were
debated and amended.2" Finally, on September 23, 1910, the
delegates, including those from the United States, signed
the final version of the Salvage Convention.24
Article 11 of the Convention read as follows:
Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious dan-
ger to his vessel, her crew, and her passengers, to render assis-
tance to everybody, even though an enemy, found at sea in danger
of being lost. The owner of the vessel incurs no liability by reason
of contravention of the above.
25
On January 30, 1912, a bill was introduced in the Sen-
ate by Senator Burton that would give effect to the treaty.26
That bill returned from the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
18. See INA H. WILDEBOER, THE BRUSSELS SALVAGE CONVENTION: ITS
UNIFYING EFFECT IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, BELGIUM AND THE
NETHERLANDS 1 (1965).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Alex L. Parks, The 1910 Brussels Convention, The United States
Salvage Act of 1912, and Arbitration of Salvage Cases in the United States, 57
TUL. L. REV. 1457, 1457-58 (1983).
23. See id. at 1458.
24. See id.
25. WILDEBOER, supra note 18, at 266.
26. See Steven F. Friedell, Compensation and Reward for Saving Life at
Sea, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1218, 1247 n.98 (1979).
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mittee on March 12, 1912, without amendment.7 On April
10, an identical bill was introduced in the House, except
this bill provided for a lower penalty for masters who fail to
save life at sea.
On April 15, 1912, the R.M.S. Titanic struck an iceberg
in the North Atlantic and sank.29 Over 1500 lives were
lost.3" The public outcry over the tragedy was intense, and
there were widespread calls for reform of shipping. As a re-
sult, on April 18, 1912, to speed the legislative process, the
Senate amended its bill to conform to the House bill, and it
passed both houses without debate over its substance.3 ' On
July 31, 1912, the bill was signed by the president and be-
came law.32
The final version of Article 11 was codified as follows:
The master or person in charge of a vessel shall, so far as he can
do so without serious danger to his own vessel, crew, or passen-
gers, render assistance to every person who is found at sea in dan-
ger of being lost; and if he fails to do so, he shall, upon conviction,
be liable to a penalty of not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment for
a term not exceeding two years, or both.
This was slightly modified in 1983, with no change in
substance:
(a) A master or individual in charge of a vessel shall render assis-
tance to any individual found at sea in danger of being lost, so far
as the master or individual in charge can do so without serious
danger to the master's or individual's vessel or individuals on
board.
(b) A master or individual violating this section shall be fined not
more than $1,000, imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.34
In the rush toward passage, most legislators assumed
that the Treaty was not in conflict with American law. 5 As
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1218.
30. See MICHAEL DAvIE, THE TiTANIc, THE FULL STORY OF A TRAGEDY 1
(1986).
31. See Friedell, supra note 26, at 1247 n.98.
32. See Parks, supra note 22, at 1462.
33. 46 U.S.C. § 728 (1982).
34. 46 U.S.C. § 2304 (1994).
35. See Parks, supra note 22, at 1458.
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one author notes, "In the United States, it was felt that the
provisions of the Convention were in general accordance
with existing law."36 In terms of property salvage, that is
true.37 In terms of life salvage, however, this Convention-
specifically in Article 11-violated some longstanding as-
sumptions about the rights and duties of American citizens.
By imposing an affirmative obligation on sailors to res-
cue those in peril, this statute runs counter to the resilient
tort distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. Fur-
thermore, there is no precedent for this law in American
admiralty. While many decisions recognize a moral duty to
help those in need, these decisions refuse to transform that
duty into a legal one. Nor can precedent be found for this
obligation in British admiralty, which is assumed to mirror
our own.
While the legislators silently approved the Salvage Act
in response to the public pressure following the Titanic
tragedy, they ignored several hundred years of British and
American decisions disavowing the duty of one stranger to
rescue another. That ignorance may have been intentional.
What politician would have the temerity to argue for the
right to let people drown in the wake of the Titanic?
THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE COMMON LAW
The common law does not impose liability for failing to
act the Good Samaritan. The most frequently cited case for
this principle is Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co., a New
Hampshire Supreme Court decision." The plaintiff, an
eight-year old boy, was brought by his older brother to work
at the defendant's mill. 9 The 13-year-old hoped to teach his
brother how to do the job of a "back boy" in the mill.4" The
court concluded that the eight-year-old was in the mill
without permission, 4 even though the defendant's overseer
was aware of the child's presence as Buch had been working
the mill for two days.4" The overseer did ask him to leave,
but the child spoke no English and did not understand the
36. Id.
37. See Friedell, supra note 26, at 1240-43.
38. 44 A. 809, 812 (N.H. 1898).
39. See id. at 809.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
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request.4" While retrieving bobbins and picking up garbage,
he put his hand in the gears of a spinning machine.44 His
hand was horribly mangled.45 He sued the mill and lost.46
The court found that the mill had violated no duty owed to
the child:
The defendants are not liable unless they owed to the plaintiff a
legal duty which they neglected to perform. With purely moral ob-
ligations the law does not deal. For example, the priest and Levite
who passed by on the other side were not, it is supposed, liable at
law for the continued suffering of the man who fell among thieves,
;vhich they might, and morally ought to have, prevented or re-
lieved. Suppose A., standing close by a railroad, sees a two year old
babe on the track, and a car approaching. He can easily rescue the
child, with entire safety to himself, and the instincts of humanity
require him to do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps, justly be
styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable
in damages for the child's injury, or indictable under the statute
for its death.47
The reason for this coldness toward the child's injury is
the age-old distinction in the common law between misfea-
sance and nonfeasance. Misfeasance is a harm created by
the conduct of the defendant. Nonfeasance is a harm unre-
lated to any act of the defendant. For example, it may be
misfeasance to punch your neighbor in the nose. But it
would be nonfeasance merely to allow a stranger to punch
that same nose.
The reason for the distinction may be said to lie in the fact that by
'misfeasance' the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the
plaintiff, while by 'nonfeasance' he has at least made his situation
no worse, and has merely failed to benefit him by interfering in his
affairs.48
Misfeasance and nonfeasance require different relation-
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., NAN GOODMAN, SHIFTING THE BLAME: LITERATURE, LAW, AND
THE THEORY OF ACCIDENTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 101 (1998) (dis-
cussing Buch's accident and displaying a photograph of another boy who was
similarly crippled by the loss of fingers in an industrial accident).
46. See Buch, 44 A. at 811.
47. Id. at 810.
48. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 339 (4th ed.
1971).
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ships between the parties for liability to be imposed. "Li-
ability for 'misfeasance' may extend to any person to whom
harm may reasonably be anticipated as a result of the de-
fendant's conduct... ."' For liability to attach to nonfea-
sance, however, there must be a "definite relation between
the parties, of such character that social policy justifies the
imposition of a duty to act."" For example, the courts have
found liability to flow from the relationship between a
shopkeeper and a business visitor, between a social host to
his guest, and between a headmaster and his students.5'
In the absence of such a relationship, nonfeasance, or
the refusal to act, has not been punished.
Because of this reluctance to countenance 'nonfeasance' as a basis
of liability, the law has persistently refused to recognize the moral
obligation of common decency and common humanity, to come to
the aid of another human being who is in danger, even though the
outcome is to cost him his life.gh
Two cases illustrate courts extending this prohibition to
cases on the water not tried under admiralty. In Osterlind
v. Hill,5 the defendant rented the decedent a canoe, even
though the decedent was visibly intoxicated.54 Out in the
middle of Lake Quannapowitt, the canoe overturned. The
decedent hung on the canoe for 30 minutes, calling loudly
for help.56 Hill heard the cries for help, but ignored them."
Osterlind drowned.58 The court sustained demurrers dis-
missing the charges, because the defendant, who rented a
canoe to a drunken man, violated no duty he owed to a
stranger.59 Similarly, in Yania v. Bigan," the defendant en-
49. Id. According to Justice Cardozo's equation, "[Tihe orbit of the danger as
disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty ....
The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk im-
ports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehen-
sion." Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
50. PROSSER, supra note 48, at 339.
51. See id. at 342.
52. Id. at 340.
53. 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928).
54. See id. at 302.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959).
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ticed the decedent to jump into a water-filled trench to help
him start a submersible pump." Bigan then watched as
Yania drowned.62 The court said, "[t]he mere fact that Bigan
saw Yania in a position of peril in the water imposed upon
him no legal, although a moral, obligation or duty to go to
his rescue unless Bigan was legally responsible, in whole or
in part, for placing Yania in the perilous position."63 Since
he did not push Yania in the water, Bigan was clear of li-
ability. "The complaint does not aver any facts which im-
pose upon Bigan legal responsibility for placing Yania in
the dangerous position in the water and, absent such legal
responsibility, the law imposes on Bigan no duty of res-
cue.,,
While the common law does not impose a duty to rescue
strangers, it does require that a Good Samaritan who de-
cides to help must act with care. If one initiates a rescue,
one may become liable for injuries that ensue. "Where per-
formance clearly has been begun, there is no doubt that
there is a duty of care."65 This duty of care is that the res-
cuer must do all that is reasonable once he undertakes a
rescue. For example, once someone begins to pull a drown-
ing man out of the water, that person is not free to walk
away merely because of a change of mind. That would make
the drowning man suffer more, and "[i]f there is no duty to
come to the assistance of a person in difficulty or peril,
there is at least a duty to avoid any affirmative acts which
make his situation worse."
66
The leading case on the duty of due care is Indian Tow-
ing Co. v. United States.67 The plaintiff in that case operated
a tugboat that ran aground on Chandeleur Island in Missis-
sippi.6 8 The tug was towing a barge full of triple super phos-
phate, which flooded with seawater in the accident, ruining
the cargo.69 Plaintiff charged that the United States Coast
Guard was negligent in maintaining the lighthouse on
61. See id. at 344.
62. See id. at 346.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. PROSSER, supra note 48, at 346.
66. Id. at 343.
67. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
68. See id. at 62.
69. See id.
2000] 599
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Chandeleur Island." Due to this negligence, the light was
out on the night of the accident. The plaintiff was not aware
the light was out and relied on its availability for naviga-
tion. The lack of light led the tug to run aground."'
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, found
that the Coast Guard was negligent, that a duty was owed
to the plaintiff, and that the United States was liable under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. 2 Justice Frankfurter based
his decision on the duty of care:
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But
once it exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur
Island and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the
light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the
light was kept in good working order; and, if the light did become
extinguished, then the Coast Guard was further obligated to use
due care to discover this fact and to repair the light or give warn-
ing that it was not functioning.7
3
The individual need not undertake a rescue, but once he
does, he had better do everything in his power to succeed.
"The result of all this is that the good Samaritan who tries
to help may find himself mulcted in damages, while the
priest and the Levite who pass by on the other side go on
their cheerful way rejoicing." 71
THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND ADMIRALTY LAW
Despite the claims of Congress that the duty imposed
by 46 U.S.C. § 2304 did not alter existing law, in truth,
American admiralty never imposed a duty to rescue. On the
contrary, several decisions discussed this lack of legal duty
and sought ways to encourage captains to rescue those in
need.
A. The Good Samaritan and Salvage
This duty to rescue those in peril at sea falls under the
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 69-70.
73. Id. at 69.
74. PROSSER, supra note 48, at 344.
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general rules of salvage.75 "Salvage is the compensation al-
lowed to persons by whose assistance a ship or her cargo
has been saved, in whole or in part, from impending peril
on the sea, or in recovering such property from actual loss,
as in cases of shipwreck, derelict, or recapture."76
"There are three prerequisites to eligibility for a salvage
award."" First, there must have been a danger at sea "from
which the ship or other property could not have been res-
cued without the salvor's assistance."78 Second, the salvor's
act "must be successful in saving, or in helping to save, at
least a part of the property at risk."79 Third, "the salvor's act
must be voluntary-that is, he must be under no official or
legal duty to render the assistance."
80
The successful salvor receives a generous reward in
light of the fundamental public policy at the basis of awards
of salvage-the encouragement of seamen to render prompt
service in future emergencies. The reward is not mere
quantum meruit-that is, recompense for work and labor
done. "Public policy encourages the hardy and adventurous
mariner to engage in these laborious and sometimes dan-
gerous enterprises, and with a view to withdraw from him
every temptation to embezzlement and dishonesty, the law
allows him, in case he is successful, a liberal compensa-
tion. ,
,)8
In considering the worth of the salvor's efforts, the trial
judge evaluates "what might be called the moral aspects of
the salvage service."82 This aspect of the salvage award de-
termination is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial
judge." "[1it goes without saying that in passing on the
75. See GUSTAVUS H. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 709 (1939).
76. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 12 (1869).
77. Ross A. Albert, Restitutionary Recovery for Rescuers of Human Life, 74
CAL. L. REv. 85, 112 (1986).
78. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 534-
35 (2d ed. 1975).
79. Id. at 535.
80. Id.
81. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. ( 10 Wall.) at 14.
82. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 78, at 562.
83. See id. The classic American formulation of the factors used in deter-
mining a salvage award is as follows: (1) The labor expended by the salvors in
rendering the salvage service; (2) The promptness, skill, and energy displayed
in rendering the service, and the danger to which such property was exposed;
(3) The value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service,
20001 601
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moral worth of a salvage service the trial judge is operating
on plastic material which he can shape to suit his own
fancy."
The difficulty with traditional salvage law, however, is
that only marine property is subject to the law of salvage."
There is no compensation given to those who save only
lives. A clear articulation of this principle is in the English
case of The Zephyrus," where the salvors saved the crew of
the stranded vessel. The ship, and all her cargo, was lost."
The majority held that life salvage, in the absence of any
salvage of property, could bring no reward.88 This decision
stands today. As Dr. Lushington said in The Zephyrus, "The
jurisdiction of the Court, in salvage cases, is founded upon a
proceeding against property which has been saved, and I
am at a loss to conceive upon what principle the owners can
be made answerable for the mere saving of life." 9 A court
later held, "One reason for this state of the law was, that no
property could be arrested applicable to the purpose. There
could be no proceeding in rem, the ancient foundation of a
salvage suit."
90
The same principle was articulated in 1840 by the
American decision, The Emblem.9 The rescuer, the Charles
Miller, saved those who were still alive and turned immedi-
ately for shore." As the weather subsided, however, her
captain, George M. Hatch, returned to the wreck to see if
any of the cargo could be saved.93 He found two trunks, one
containing theatrical costumes, the other containing over
$500 in specie and over $8000 in other negotiable instru-
ments.94 District Judge Ware stated the rule of life salvage:
and the danger to which such property was exposed; (4) The risk incurred by
the salvors in securing the property from the impending peril; (5) The value of
the property saved; (6) The degree of danger from which the property was res-
cued. See id.
84. Id.
85. See ROBINSON, supra note 75, at 712.
86. 166 Eng. Rep. 596 (1842).
87. See id. at 596.
88. See id. at 597.
89. Id.
90. The Fusilier, 16 Eng. Rep. 19, 21 (1865).
91. 8 F. Cas. 611 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4434).
92. See id. at 612.
93. See id.
94. See id.
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[A] court of admiralty has no authority to allow a reward merely
for the saving of life. That, as is observed by Lord Stowell, "must
be left to the bounty of individuals. But when it is connected with
the preservation of property, then the court can take notice of it,
and it is always willing to join that to the animus displayed in the
first instance."95
Because the Charles Miller saved some cargo along with the
hapless crew, she was able to partake of a share of the re-
ward.9 Had she not turned around, however, and merely
saved their lives, she would have been barred from collect-
ing any compensation for her services.97 This was echoed in
1859 in The Mulhouse:
Compensation for saving life, except the life of a slave unconnected
with the saving of property, is left by the law to the voluntary
bounty of individuals. Indeed, if no property is saved, no means
are supplied by which the court can reward the salvor. A suit in
personam for salvage for saving the life of a free person, would be
a novelty and probably could not be maintained, unless under very
special circumstances, of an express contract.
9 8
The would-be rescuer is thus left in a predicament. For
saving life, he is given nothing but the gratitude of those he
saves. For rescuing property, he is allowed up to half the
value of what he recovers. In approaching a vessel in dis-
tress, then, he needs to decide whether to follow the
prompting of his heart or the prompting of his purse. There
is a natural temptation to save property first and look
95. Id. (citation omitted).
96. See id. at 614.
97. See id.
98. 17 F. Cas. 962, 967 (S.D. Fla. 1859) (No. 9910) (citations omitted). It is
sadly ironic that the legal definition of slaves as property made them more
likely to be saved than others if found at sea. For example, in Bass v. Five Ne-
groes, the court granted salvage to a captain who found some escaped slaves
suffering at sea:
It appears that these five negroes had been driven out to sea in a ca-
noe, and that they were picked up by Captain Bass... about sixty
leagues from land. They were destitute of provisions and water, and,
according to the account given by the negroes, had been so for four
days .... The canoe and negroes may be valued at three thousand
dollars .... I shall be satisfied with decreeing one tenth. Let Captain
Bass be paid that sum; and let the owner of the negroes pay the costs,
as it appears that they stole the canoe.
2 F. Cas. 1006, 1007 (D.S.C. 1803) (No. 1093). Had they been free, however, no
salvage would have been given to Captain Bass.
6032000]
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around for survivors later.9 As a result, both the United
States and Britain have altered their laws of salvage to
compensate those who save both property and lives, and
those who save lives while another vessel saves the prop-
erty. Great Britain, under the Merchant Shipping Act of
1894, created a fund to reward those who rescue lives in the
absence of other salvage.' 0 The principle remains, however,
in American law, that there can be no salvage award for
saving life in the absence of saving property.
Besides demonstrating the prohibition against granting
awards for saving life, the salvage cases also indicate seri-
ous reservations about imposing a legal duty to save those
in peril. Often, the judges chafe at their inability to reward
mere life salvors because they feel such rewards would en-
courage the selfish toward altruism. Judge Ware, in The
Emblem, made his anger at this constraint palpable:
[Iln the present case, there are some circumstances which, I am
free to say, have struck my mind with considerable surprise. They
are, that this vessel should have lain, for four days, in one of the
most frequented parts of the American seas, with vessels continu-
ally passing her, some of them almost within hailing distance, and
when they were in full view of this unhappy company, who were
lying thus lashed and dying upon the wreck, and no one came to
their relief until more than half of their number were released
from their sufferings, by death, and consigned to a watery grave. It
is a fact, which would seem to be incredible, if it did not rest upon
indubitable and unsuspected proof. If this fact is to be taken as ajust measure of the humanity of the persons who frequent those
seas, I know not but it may be the part, not only of humanity, but
of worldly wisdom, to let them understand that sometimes even in
99. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 78, at 572 ("[Ilt is still far more profit-
able to save property than to save lives."). In fact, one judge thought that this
tension, between saving bodies and saving lives, was the reason behind 46
U.S.C. § 2304.
The statute, I think, presupposed possibly a divided interest, and
probably a sordid interest, in the average salvor. It imposed penalties
of fine or imprisonment, or both, upon the master or person in charge
of a vessel who failed, so far as he could do so without serious danger to
his own vessel, crew, or passengers, to render assistance to any person
who was found at sea in danger of being lost. It also aimed to stimu-
late, or excite, at least as much effort to save human life as ordinarily
would be spent in saving vessel or cargo. It is a sad reflection to con-
template this law.
In re St. Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co. The Eastland, 262 F. 535, 539-40 (N.D. Ill.
1919).
100. See ROBiNSON, supra note 75, at 718 & n.28.
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godliness there is gain, and to tempt them by the allurements of
pecuniary Rrofit, if they can be led by no other, to acts of humanity
and mercy.
Judge Ware knew of no legal duty for those passing
ships to rescue those suffering on the Emblem. Instead, he
hoped the "allurements of pecuniary profit" would encour-
age others to help those in need. Greed may succeed where
charity fails.
B. The Good Samaritan and Deviation
Further evidence that there was no duty to rescue un-
der traditional admiralty can be found in the doctrine of de-
viation in marine insurance.
A marine insurance policy is a contract between an as-
sured, usually the ship, and an assurer, usually a corpora-
tion." "[Tlhe assured agrees to pay a premium, and the as-
surer agrees that, if certain losses or damage occur to
certain interests of the assured, at risk in a marine venture,
the assurer will indemnify the assured." °3 The policy can
cover the vessel, the cargo, or some other marine subject
matter."
Most marine insurance policies are secured through
brokers, who are agents of the assured and who are com-
pensated by a cut of the premium paid to the underwriter.'
The first step is for the broker to draft the policy, filled out
to the specifications of the assured, and present that policy
to the underwriter. 6 The underwriter can decline the risk
entirely, or he can name his premium and any special con-
ditions he demands. 7 Once they agree to terms, the policy
is signed and becomes a binder, which, once sealed, be-
comes a perfected policy.0 8
That policy "may cover the risks of a single designated
voyage, or may insure [the ship] for a period of time."0 9
101. 8 F. Cas. 611, 612-13 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4434).
102. See GILMORE & BLAcK, supra note 78, at 56.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 57.
105. See id. at 56-57.
106. See id. at 57.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Id.
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Cargo is almost always insured for the voyage, since that is
its natural life at sea." ° To deter fraud and "welcome" disas-
ters at sea, the policy also usually requires that the assured
have an "insurable interest" in the items covered by the
policy."' The English Marine Insurance Act states,
[A] person is interested in a marine adventure where he stands in
any legal or equitable relation to the adventure or to any insurable
property at risk therein, in consequence of which he may benefit
by the safety or due arrival of insurable property, or may be preju-
diced by its loss, or by damage thereto ....
The nexus between the Good Samaritan and the marine
insurance policy is in the doctrine of deviation. Any devia-
tion in a voyage can make the policy void.
In voyage policies, the assurer is deemed to have intended to ac-
cept only that risk that inheres in the expeditious prosecution of
the voyage by the usual commercial route. Where the vessel with-
out excuse departs from this route, or delays unreasonably in pur-
suing the voyage, the policy is ousted. The contract of insurance,
once ousted by a deviation, is gone forever; return to the proper
course does not restore it."
3
Courts have held that any unexpected conduct by a
master may constitute a deviation.
As applied in admiralty law, the term 'deviation' was originally
and generally employed to express the wandering or straying of a
vessel from the customary course of the voyage, but in the course
of time it has come to mean any variation in the conduct of a ship
in the carriage of goods whereby the risk incident to the shipment
will be increased .... 114
That makes the owner of the ship liable for any damage
that may ensue to cargo, whether through negligence or
not. He, in effect, becomes the insurer for anything covered
under the voided policy. "Deviation in the maritime law
means a wilful or negligent variation in the conduct of the
undertaking as well as a roundabout course. Its effect is to
110. See id. at 57-58.
111. See id. at 59.
112. Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch.41, § 5 (Eng.).
113. See GILMoRE & BLAcK, supra note 78, at 66 (footnotes omitted).
114. G.W. Sheldon & Co. v. Hamburg Amerikanische Packetfahrt Actien-
Gesellschaft, 28 F.2d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 1928).
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deprive the vessel of the protection of contractual and
statutory exemptions." 5
Stopping to rescue someone lost at sea could very easily
be deemed a deviation from the voyage and could, therefore,
render a policy void. For a captain carrying a cargo of per-
ishables, every minute and every ounce of fuel counts. The
inevitable delay caused by a rescue or salvage operation
could spoil his cargo, eliminate his profit through increased
fuel costs, and make him liable to the cargo owners for their
loss of goods. Such a danger would worry the most altruis-
tic captains. More worrisomeis the language in Niles-
Bement-Pond Co. v. Dampkiesaktieselskabet Balto:
[A] failure to carry as required by the terms of the bill of lading, or
a deviation of the voyage gives the shipper the right to consider
the goods as converted by the deviator, and the ship responsible
for damages due to breach of the contract of carriage, without any
reference to the question of whether the deviation had any bearing
on the particular loss complained of .... 116
The Good Samaritan who stops to save life may in fact find
himself branded as one of the thieves.
American courts, however, have consistently refused to
allow policies to be voided because of life salvage. One of the
earliest is Justice Washington's opinion in Bond v. The
Cora."7 The captain of the Ceres salvaged the Cora, which
had been abandoned at sea."' The owner of the cargo being
shipped on the Ceres wanted part of the salvage award.'
He claimed that the rescue was a deviation, that the con-
tract on the cargo was void, and that he was without protec-
tion had the Ceres failed to reach port.2 ' For that risk, he
demanded a share in the spoils. 2' Justice Washington de-
nied his claim, saying there was no deviation:
[T]he general definition of the deviation is, a voluntary departure
from the course of the voyage insured, without necessity or rea-
sonable cause; and I recollect no case, where the justification is not
essentially connected with the motive of safety to the property in-
115. ROBINSON, supra note 75, at 532.
116. 282 F. 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1922).
117. 3 F. Cas. 838 (D. Penn. 1807) (No. 1621).
118. See id. at 839.
119. See id. at 840.
120. See id.
121. See id.
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sured. If the object of the deviation be to save the life of a man, I
will not be the first judge to exclude such a case from the excep-
tions to the general rule. The humanity of the motive, and the mo-
rality of the act, give it a strong claim to indulgence .... 122
But Justice Washington refused to grant that same indul-
gence to one who stops for property only: "If the stoppage be
continued, or the risk increased, by adding to the cargo, di-
minishing the crew, or by other means, for the purpose of
saving the property found, I think the underwriters are dis-
charged.
" pt
What is important about Justice Washington's opinion
is that he never indicates that the captain of the Ceres was
under a legal duty to stop and check on the Cora." The rea-
son for this omission is simple: there was no such duty.
Early American admiralty law recognized no legal duty to
rescue those in need. The Court took pains to prevent an in-
surer from imposing deviation for the saving of life. Had
there been a duty to save life, no discussion would have
been necessary. This is borne out by Justice Story's circuit
opinion in The Boston... where he builds on Justice Wash-
ington's decision.
The schooner Boston was on her way from Baltimore to
Portland, Maine with a cargo of flour, corn, and feathers.2 '
In the dark of night, she was run over by another schooner
and began filling with water.'27 The crew abandoned her in
the ship's longboat. 8 They soon came across the Magno-
lia.29 She too had just been in a collision, and she was
leaking badly.3 ' The crew of the Boston boarded the Magno-
lia. 3' At dawn, they could see that the Boston was still
afloat.'32 They tied her to the Magnolia, and she was towed
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See generally id.
125. 3 F. Cas. 932 (D. Mass. 1833) (No. 1673).
126. See id. at 935.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. It is unclear whether the same vessel struck both ships and
sailed on, or if the Magnolia and the Boston themselves collided. The latter
seems the most plausible.
132. See id.
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safely into Boston harbor.133 The Magnolia's crew and mas-
ter sued the owner of the Boston for a salvage award for
their efforts.' Though it is merely dicta, Justice Story laid
the groundwork for duty:
Beyond all question, at least in my opinion, it was the duty of the
master of the Magnolia to interrupt his voyage for the purpose of
taking on board the crew of the Boston in their suffering state, for
the safety of their lives. It was a duty thrown on him by the first
principles of natural law, the duty to succour the distressed; and it
is enforced by the more positive and imperative commands of
Christianity. The stopping for this purpose could not, in my judg-
ment, be deemed by any tribunal in Christendom a deviation from
the voyage, so as to discharge any insurance, or to render the mas-
ter criminally or civilly liable for any subsequent disasters to his
vessel occasioned thereby. But beyond this there was no superven-
ing or imperative duty.
While there may be a moral duty to aid those in need, a
moral duty that begs the indulgence of the court to waive
the deviation penalty, there was no legal duty to rescue. As
Justice Story says, "there was no supervening or imperative
duty."31 6 The power of Story's rhetoric betrays his intent: be-
cause there was no legal duty to rescue, the court had to
warn underwriters that pigheaded enforcement of contracts
would not be tolerated. If the law could not mandate altru-
ism, it could at least allow it to flourish.
This reluctance to enforce altruism under marine in-
surance, however, continued well into the twentieth cen-
tury. Further evidence that there was no duty to rescue in
American admiralty law by the date of the Brussels Con-
vention are two provisions in the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act of 1936"' and the Harter Act of 1893" relating to in-
surance. Both acts contain provisions about "deviation" and
life saving. Both specifically prohibit insurance companies
from charging deviation to those vessels that stop to rescue
life.139
According to the common law of contracts, a contract
133. See id.
134. See id. at 933.
135. Id. at 935 (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1998).
138. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-195 (1998).
139. See ROBINSON, supra note 75, at 533.
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that violates the law will not be enforced. For example, one
cannot make a binding contract to commit murder.4 If
there were a legal duty to rescue those lost at sea, any ma-
rine insurance policy that forbade rescue by reason of de-
viation, in derogation of that legal duty, would be void on
its face. Justices Story and Washington did not void the
policies-they chose merely not to call the rescue a devia-
tion. Importantly, neither in The Boston nor in Bond v. The
Cora was cargo spoiled in any way. It is uncertain how the
justices would have ruled if the rescues had led to financial
losses for the cargo owners. What is certain is that there
was no legal duty to rescue before the Brussels Convention.
Such a duty would have made the language of the Harter
Act and the Carriage of Goods at Sea Act superfluous. No
insurance policy that contemplated violation of a legal duty
would be enforceable in a court of law.
THE ADJUDICATION OF THE GOOD SAMARITAN STATUTE
Cases examining 46 U.S.C. §2304 are rarely reported.
Dead men tell no tales. Nor do they sue. Only those casta-
ways who survive, and who can identify a passing ship,
would be able to sue the ship's captain for leaving them be-
hind. A decedent's family would have little means of discov-
ering which ships may have passed by a loved one. None-
theless, there are cases on the books, and the leading case
examining the duty to rescue is Warshauer v. Lloyd
Sabaudo, argued before the Second Circuit in 1934.
Warshauer and a friend set out one October afternoon
in 1931 in a motorboat. The engine failed, and they drifted
farther and farther out into the Atlantic. They had no
food." The defendant was an Italian Corporation, which
owned several steamships. One of these came within hail-
ing distance of the plaintiff13 Warshauer displayed a rec-
ognized signal of distress and requested the steamer come
to his assistance. 44 "The defendant's servants on said
steamer, particularly its operating personnel, clearly ob-
140. As one court said, "If the conditions of the statute were made for the
benefit of the public.., an agreement is void that does not comply with the
[statute] ... ." Bowdoin v. Alabama Chemical Co., 79 So. 4, 5 (Ala. 1918).
141. 71 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1934).
142. See id. at 146.
143. See id.
144. See id.
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served his signals of distress, but refused to heed them or to
stop and take the plaintiff aboard, although they could have
done so without peril to themselves or their vessel ....145
Two days later, the plaintiff was rescued by a Coast Guard
cutter.'6 "In the meantime and in consequence of the expo-
sure and deprivations to which he was subjected by the
failure of the defendant's steamship to render the requested
aid, the plaintiff suffered permanent physical inju-
ries ....
At trial, "[t]he question chiefly debated was whether the
common law or the law of the sea recognizes the existence
of a legal duty coextensive with the universally admitted
moral duty to rescue a stranger from peril, when this can be
done without risk to the one called upon for help."48 The
circuit court abandoned this question: "This interesting
problem we pass by as unnecessary to the decision."49 In-
stead, the court framed the issue in different terms:
The precise issue is whether a shipowner is liable for damages to a
stranger in peril on the high seas to whom the ship's master has
failed to give aid. This situation, it may be noted, involves no per-
sonal dereliction of a moral duty by the person sought to be held to
respond in damages.
150
The question, much to the plaintiffs dismay, became one of
respondeat superior. The fault was the master's, not the
owner's, and "moral obliquity is not imputed to one person-
ally innocent." 5' As a result, the plaintiff lost his case and
collected no damages.'52 Though the court did recognize that
the plaintiff had established a cause of action against the
master, such an action would do nothing for his injuries.
Only the well-financed coffers of the owner could make the
plaintiff whole.
This decision established 46 U.S.C. § 2304 as valid and
binding. One of the plaintiffs arguments was that he
should not be bound by the plain language of the statute,
145. Id.
146. See id. at 146-47.
147. Id. at 147.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 148.
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which absolved the owner of criminal liability.5 ' He claimed
that the treaty was invalid because some of its provisions
were not enacted by the legislature.
It is further urged that the treaty is not self-executing, that article
11 is no more than expression of policy and by the very terms of
article 12 requires legislation to carry into effect, and that Con-
gress in enacting such legislation dealt only with the criminal li-
ability of the master, leaving untouched the civil liability of both
master and owner, so that no implication can be drawn, either
from the treaty or the statute, that civil liability does not exist.
5 4
The court scotched this argument and established the
treaty as the law of the land. "As a declaration of the views
of the great maritime nations, the treaty needs no 'imple-
mentation' by legislation."'55
The next case to interpret the statute was The Lillian
E. Kerr v. Publicover.'56 The Lillian E. Kerr, a four-masted
schooner, was en route from New York to Halifax with a
load of coal on November 12, 1942.' s' She had all her sails
set, but made little headway. 8 No moon was visible, and
the skies were overcast."' It was a quiet night on the schoo-
ner, just north of Cape Cod. 6 ' With the exception of the
watchstanders, the crew was asleep below decks."'
Heading toward the Kerr was the steamship Alcoa Pi-
lot, part of a convoy heading south from Halifax to New
York. '6 There were eight ships in the convoy, steaming in
four columns of two ships each. 6 ' To the outside of the col-
umns were three Canadian corvettes, serving as anti-
submarine pickets."M The Alcoa Pilot was the lead ship in
the far left column.'65 Behind her was the Rita, another
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 71 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), affd sub nom, Publicover v. Alcoa S.S.
Co., 168 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1948).
157. See id. at 186.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 186.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
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steamship bound for New York.'66 None of these shis dis-
played the running lights required by maritime law. 67 The
North Atlantic in 1942 was a killing field for shipping.
German U-Boats still had the upper hand in the battle for
the sea, and the United States Secretary of the Navy had
suspended the navigation rules, such as running lights, to
protect the convoys carrying vital war supplies.6 '
The Kerr, however, did display her lights. 9 The watch
officer on the Alcoa Pilot saw those lights but did nothing to
warn the schooner. 7 ' Nor did he change course to avoid col-
lision. The Alcoa Pilot struck the Kerr on her starboard
side, near the bow, and cut the schooner in half.'7' In five
minutes, the ship sank to the bottom of the ocean.'72 After
the collision, following the standing orders of the convoy,
the Alcoa Pilot adjusted her course to stay within her col-
umn."'73 She did nothing to search for potential survivors
from the Kerr.74 The ship astern of the Alcoa Pilot, the Rita,
heard the screams and pleadings of the crew of the Kerr. 
v
7
The Rita assumed that the screams were from the victims
of some ship torpedoed by the Germans, and the standing
orders of the convoy were to stay in formation and not come
to those in need. 7 Such altruism, it was felt, would risk
giving the U-boat more victims. The men of the Kerr,
thrown from their sleep into the icy Atlantic, could see the
steamships looming near them. They could even see the
faces of the watch standers looking at them from the bridge.
No one did anything to help the men in the water. Not a
ship slowed, no one threw a life ring or life vest over the
side, and no one radioed the shore. All hands on board the
Lillian E. Kerr were lost.
177
The victims' families sued the Alcoa Pilot in admiralty
under the Stand-by Act for negligence, both in causing the
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 188.
169. See id. at 186.
170. See id. at 186-87.
171. See id. at 186.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 186-87.
174. See id. at 189.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 186.
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collision and in refusing to aid the survivors.'78 The Alcoa
Pilot impleaded the Rita and the rest of the ships in the
convoy for refusing to come to the aid of the survivors. 9
The Alcoa Pilot based its claim on 46 U.S.C. § 2304 (for-
merly § 728).18
The federal district judge, in his decision, ignored the
statutory duty of § 2304. " Instead, he hid behind the rules
of the Stand-by Act,8 2 which required only a ship involved
in the collision to search for survivors: "[I]t shall be the duty
of the master or those in charge of each vessel, insofar as he
can do so without serious danger to his own vessel, to stay
by the other vessel and to render such assistance as may be
practical and necessary... .""' As neither the Rita nor the
other ships were involved in the collision, it had no duty to
assist. Moreover, in the judge's opinion, the demands of the
war trumped all other navigation rules. "The Congress had
authorized the waiver of compliance with the Navigation
Laws upon request of the Secretary of the Navy to such ex-
tent and manner as he finds necessary in the conduct of the
war .... ,""4 These were codified in a series of rules for the
conduct of convoys. These provided that
rear ships, unless they receive orders to the contrary, are to act as
rescue ships and are to proceed to the assistance of any vessel in
their respective column which may be damaged by normal marine
risk, such as a collision or man overboard. The duty of the rear
vessel is specifically confined to the assistance of vessels forming a
part of its own column."
1 85
That duty, to save only those that are part of the convoy,
holds precedent over a general duty to rescue. It was then
178. See id. at 189.
179. See id. at 186.
180. See id. at 187.
181. The judge did not address the issue of whether the other ships in the
convoy had a duty to rescue. There was no question that the Rita and the other
vessels knew there were men in the water. "They did hear shouts off on her
starboard side some 300 feet away, but thought that there had been a torpedo-
ing somewhere ahead and the shouts came from survivors adrift in a lifeboat or
on a raft." Id. at 189. Because of the dangers of U-boats, they decided not to act.
"[S]ubmarines might be nearby, and that pursuant to convoy orders they should
hold to their station and not get separated from the convoy." Id.
182. 33 U.S.C. § 367 (repealed 1983).
183. Lillian E. Kerr, 71 F. Supp at 189.
184. Id. at 188.
185. Id. at 189.
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widely known that U-boats waited for rescue ships to come
to the aid of torpedoed vessels, and the safest option, until
sonar became widely used, was to stay away from wrecks.
In time of war, then, there is no duty to rescue someone in
distress at sea. The men of the Lillian Kerr were left to the
sea, even though there were no reports of submarines in the
area, even though their cries were heard from several ships,
and even though the convoy was just barely out of sight of
land.
After the war, the courts began to interpret the statute
more broadly, allowing it to embrace a wider notion of duty
and to change the fundamental ideas of life salvage. The
most liberal of these decisions is the Peninsular & Oriental
Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc.'
The Overseas Progress, an American flag tanker owned
by defendant, was en route from Haifa to Baltimore when a
crewman suffered a heart attack."7 The Overseas Progress
did not have a doctor aboard, but guided by the ship's medi-
cal books and radio advice from the Public Health Service,
her officers attempted to care for the stricken man.'88 When
he had another attack the next day, the master of the Over-
seas Progress radioed for any vessel in the vicinity that had
a doctor aboard.' The nearest vessel to respond was the
Canberra, a British passenger vessel owned by Peninsular
& Oriental Steam Navigation Company.9 ' She was en route
from Dakar to New York. She had a maximum speed of 25
knots and was equipped with her own hospital and medical
personnel.' The Overseas Progress sent a second message
to the Canberra requesting a rendezvous to transfer the
crewmember.'92 At that point, the Overseas Progress was
740 miles from the nearest hospital in Newfoundland.'93 The
Overseas Progress, a vessel of 13,000 gross tons with a
maximum speed of about 13.8 knots, could not have reached
there in less than 57 hours.9 4 The Canberra, by increasing
her normal speed to 25 knots, was able to affect the rendez-
186. 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977).
187. See id. at 832.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 832-33.
193. See id. at 833.
194. See id. at 832-33.
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vous in 6 hours.95 After the transfer was made, the Can-
berra resumed her course to New York, still at 25 knots,
and arrived there only two and one half hours later than
scheduled, though she had to travel an additional 232 miles
to save the life of the crewman.
196
Although Overseas Oil, as owners, paid Canberra's sur-
geon for services rendered, it refused to pay Peninsular &
Oriental for the expenses incurred due to the extra distance
traveled at increased speed.' 97 The district court granted
summary judgment to Overseas Oil, based on the tradi-
tional rule that there could be no award for pure life sal-
vage where there was no simultaneous recovery of prop-
erty.
98
The Court of Appeals, although critical of this tradi-
tional doctrine, avoided the issue of life salvage. It granted
restitution to the Canberra not because of life salvage, but
because the ship assumed the Overseas Progress's duty of
maintenance and cure of its crewmember. 9 -"Through her
expeditious intervention, the Canberra performed the Over-
seas Progress's duty to Turpin [the stricken sailor], far more
swiftly and more efficiently than it could have been carried
out by the Overseas Progress. In such circumstances, the
principles of 'quasi-contract' require recovery."
200
The court acknowledged the common law bias against
Good Samaritans:
Although the law ordinarily frowns on the claims of a 'mere volun-
teer,' there is a class of cases where it is imperative that a duty be
performed swiftly and efficiently for the protection of the public or
an innocent third party, in which a 'good Samaritan' who volun-
tarily intervenes to perform the duty may receive restitution for
his services. This rule has become crystallized in the doctrine that
performance of another's duty to a third person, if rendered by one
qualified to provide such services with intent to charge for them, is
a ground for recovery in quasi-contract.
201
The court also acknowledged that its decision violated
the traditions of salvage law.
195. See id. at 833.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 834.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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In admiralty, a person who rescues property at sea may obtain an
award based not merely on the costs he incurs but on the value of
the property saved and the degree of danger encountered. These
rules are designed to encourage seamen to render valorous service
in the salvage of property, and remuneration has accordingly been
liberal. Yet it seems to have been admiralty law that rescuing lives
at sea, rather than property, merited moral approbation, but no
pecuniary reward .... But, we do not find the rule on pure life
salvage, regardless of its dubious vitality, relevant to the facts.
[Peninsular & Oriental] is not seekin a reward; it merely re-
quests reimbursement for its expenses.
Once again, a court ignored the substance of the statute
for its spirit. Even though the distinction between finding
Turpin floating in a raft and saving him and finding him
near death on a ship and saving him is a fine one, the
courts seem loathe to enforce the statute. By the letter of
the law, the Canberra had a duty to save Turpin: "A mas-
ter.., shall render assistance to any individual found at
sea in danger of being lost."23 The statute does not differen-
tiate between those floating in the water and those suffer-
ing on a ship. Where someone is in danger for his life, aid
must be given. The Canberra had no choice; she must res-
cue Turpin. Under traditional salvage, she could share in
the salvage award for any property saved along with the
life. But since no property was saved with Turpin, there
could be no reward. The Court of Appeals, however, allowed
the Canberra to collect a reward, or at least a quantum
meruit, for doing something she was required to do by law.
Had there been a legal duty to rescue, the Canberra could
expect no compensation. Since the court hesitated to hold
the Canberra bound by the affirmative duty to rescue, it
chose instead to ignore the entire issue and found the deci-201
sion in quasi-contract. This reflects the real hesitation
courts seem to experience at imposing an affirmative duty
on individuals. Had this taken place on land rather than in
the Atlantic, the Canberra would have received nothing:
On land the person who rushes in to save another's property from
danger is an officious intermeddler, the volunteer whom even eq-
202. Id. at 835-36 (citation omitted).
203. 46 U.S.C. § 2304 (1994) (emphasis added).
204. The court, in effect, gave the Canberra a reward for obeying the law. By
way of analogy, that is like a state trooper pulling over a motorist and giving
him $100 for obeying the speed limit.
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uity will not aid .... The person who saves life on land is similarly
treated, except that he may count on a paragraph in the court's
opinion paying tribute to his good character.
2 0 5
Likewise, "Life salvage, unaccompanied by property
salvage, still goes unrewarded." °6 The court's attempts at
novelty betray its anxiety. In effect, the court seems to say,
"If masters are to be held accountable, they may as well
profit from their vigilance."
The courts added another wrinkle to the interpretation
of the statute in Martinez v. Puerto Rico Marine Manage-
ment."7 Martinez held that the Indian Towing duty of care
was applicable to 46 U.S.C. § 2304. Hoyt Dixon and Denny
Jones, Honduran fishermen, set sail on March 11, 1986
from Bayou La Batre, Alabama, to their native land.2 8
Their boat, the Joan J II, was a seventy-six-foot shrimper. "
Almost three hundred miles out to sea, the weather turned
foul and the Joan J began taking in water from the bow.210
Dixon and Jones, troubled by the mounting seas, turned
back to Bayou La Batre, both to make repairs and to have a
following sea."' They called Dixon's wife over the radio, let-
ting her know that their bilge pumps were keeping up with
the leak and that they had "good hopes of making it back."212
Then the storm swung on its axis, slamming waves into
the Joan 's damaged bow."1 On the night of March 13, the
Ponce, a 760-foot container ship on route from Puerto Rico
to New Orleans, received a May Day call from the Joan j. 214
She proceeded toward the shrimper, which she sighted an
hour later. The winds varied from 40 to 50 mph, and the
seas had grown heavy and mixed. The shrimper was
pounded by "heavy swells, very rough seas."215 One of her
bilge pumps had failed. The boat, however, was still under
her own power and appeared to be in no immediate danger
205. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 78, at 532.
206. Id.
207. 755 F. Supp. 1001 (S.D. Ala. 1990).
208. See id. at 1002.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 1003.
211. See id. This would put her stern into the waves and slow the leak in the
bow.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. Id.
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of sinking.216
The captain of the Ponce lowered his pilot ladder over
the side and ordered his ship to sail to the north of the Joan
J to block the wind and create a lee for rescue efforts. 217 The
seas proved too rough, however, for the Joan J to come
alongside the Ponce.! The captain then tied a line to a fifty-
five-gallon drum to float it toward the Joan J, but this was
swept aft of the Ponce because the ship was still underway
in a boiling sea.1 9 When advised by a crewmember that the
best plan of action would be to wait for the storm to subside,
the captain of the Ponce replied that he had a "schedule to
meet." 21
Jones and Dixon now realized that the Joan J was
sinking, and they asked the Ponce to take them off.22' The
captain of the Ponce then ordered his men to fire a line to
the Joan J using the Lyle gun, a rocket propelled line-
throwing device.2 He told Jones and Dixon to tie them-
selves to the line and he would be pull them aboard, even
though the Ponce was still underway. 223 The two fishermen
tied themselves off, and then jumped in the boiling seas.224
Almost as soon as Jones and Dixon hit the water, they
were sucked underneath the ship. There, Dixon died.2 5 It
took nine crewmen over five minutes to haul him aboard,
and only after they rigged a block and tackle. 26 Denny
Jones had snapped free of the line when he jumped in the
water.2 Since he was wearing a life vest, it was likely that
he had been swept aft of the Ponce and was floating astern.
Nonetheless, the captain of the Ponce ordered the ship to
proceed full speed ahead.22' No one looked for Denny Jones,
who was thrity-three years old at the time. He left behind a
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 1004.
221. See id. at 1003.
222. See id. at 1004.
223. See id.
224. See id. One crewman from the Ponce knew the danger of this idea be-
cause "in the midship of a ship all the current goes straight underneath the ship
and goes straight to the screw." Id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
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wife, two sons, and two daughters. He was the family's sole
support.
2 9
His family sued in federal court for that loss of sup-
port.' ° Under the Death on the High Seas Act, 3' the survi-
vors of an individual can bring a cause of action for a
"wrongful act, neglect or default occurring on the high seas
beyond a marine league from the shore of any State."32 This
cause of action may be based on negligence. To support a
cause of action in admiralty based on negligence, the plain-
tiff must show: 1) a duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff; 2) a breach of that duty; 3) prejudice or damage
sustained by the plaintiff; and 4) a causal connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and plaintiffs damage. 33
Here, the court found that the captain of the Ponce vio-
lated the duty imposed on him by 46 U.S.C. § 2304. The
owners of the Ponce were found liable for the death of Dixon
and Jones, and they had to pay over $1.2 million in dam-
ages to the fishermen's survivors. 34 Critical to the court's
decision, however, was the traditional common law re-
quirement that a rescue once begun must be carried out in
good faith, as the Supreme Court outlined in Indian Tow-
ing. Though the court acknowledged the Ponce's duty to
rescue Jones and Dixon, the liability for the owners turned
on the captain's abandonment of the rescue.
THE TRIUMPH OF THE COMMON LAW
In spite of the mandate of 46 U.S.C. § 2304; in spite of
the Second Circuit's decision in Warshauer v. Lloyd
Sabaudo; and in spite of repeated calls for the enactment of
a law imposing a general duty to rescue, American courts
hold fast to the common law tradition against affirmative
duties when adjudicating admiralty claims. Even where the
229. See id. at 1005.
230. See id. at 1005-06. It is unclear how the families heard about the trag-
edy. It may be safe to assume that the Ponce's crew notified the authorities
when the ship reached port. Several crewmen testified for the plaintiffs at trial.
If someone had not come forward, the sea would have swallowed the whole sad
tale.
231. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1998).
232. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761 (1998).
233. See Desmond v. Holland America Cruises, 1981 A.M.C. 211 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
234. See Martinez, 755 F. Supp. at 1008.
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statute imposes a duty to rescue, the courts hesitate to en-
force that duty with liability, either civil or criminal.
Most of the admiralty cases where courts refuse to im-
pose a duty are the progeny of Indian Towing. Since that
plaintiff was allowed to recover against the Coast Guard,
the courts have found themselves swamped with plaintiffs
suing the Coast Guard for failing to save their vessels. The
leading case is Lacey v. United States.1 5 The administrator
of the estate of a pilot who lost his life in Massachusetts
Bay after his plane crashed sued the United States for the
Coast Guard's failure to rescue him. 216 The court dismissed
the claim based on the common law: "It is well settled com-
mon law that a mere bystander incurs no liability where he
fails to take any action, however negligently or even inten-
tionally, to rescue another in distress." 7 The court did,
however, reinforce the Indian Towing requirement for due
care:
It is true that, while the common law imposes no duty to rescue, it
does impose on the Good Samaritan the duty to act with due care
once he has undertaken rescue operations. The rationale is that
other would-be rescuers will rest on their oars in the expectation
that effective aid is being rendered.
238
The courts have seized on this limitation of liability.
Though the cases deal with the duties of the Coast Guard,
the language is broader, sweeping private vessels into the
same excuse from duty. In Frank v. United States,3 9 the
Third Circuit held that
in the absence of any duty creating a relationship the responsibil-
ity of a volunteer is strictly limited. He may be liable if the injured
person has been harmed because of reliance upon some represen-
tation concerning the voluntary service. More generally, if an at-
tempted rescue of other voluntary service is so conducted that it
affirmatively injures the one in distress or worsens his position,
there may be liability.
240
235. 98 F. Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 1951).
236. See id.
237. Id. at 220.
238. Id.
239. 250 F.2d 178 (3d. Cir. 1957).
240. Id. at 180 (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69
(1955)).
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The Ninth Circuit agrees with this formulation of the
law of the Good Samaritan at sea, as the recent case of
Korpi v. United States241 makes clear. The plaintiff, Glen
Korpi, was a sixty-one year old man trying to sail, by him-
self, from Dana Point, California, to Seattle, Washington. 42
He left his home on May 24, 1995.243 His boat, the Dialogue,
was a 27-foot fiberglass sloop.244 The weather turned sour.
The wind gusted to forty knots, and the seas were over six
feet.245 He was forced to use both his engine and his sail to
maintain headway north.46 Sometime before June 5, he re-
alized that he would never make it to Seattle, so he turned
to head back to Dana Point.247 On June 5, his automatic
steering failed. That forced him to man the tiller himself,
which prevented him from sleeping.2 48 He decided to head
for Monterey Bay, but the swells had increased to ten feet,
topped by six-foot waves. His engine failed. 49 He called the
Coast Guard for assistance in identifying his location be-
cause he still thought he could reach the harbor safely. 5 '
When he passed the latitude and longitude off his Global
Positioning System (GPS) to the Coast Guard, they realized
that he was on the wrong side of the Monterey Peninsula,
that he could not make it to the harbor, and that he had put
himself between the wind and the shore, or a "lee shore."'
With no engine, he had no way, other than by dropping an-
chor, to keep from running aground.252 He dropped his an-
chor, which appeared to hold. 5 ' The Coast Guard dis-
patched a search-and-rescue team to save Korpi. Their
forty-one-foot motor lifeboat reached him within a few
hours.254 Because of the storm, the lifeboat could not ap-
241. 961 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1997), affd 145 F.3d 1338, No. 97-15704,
1998 WL 231207 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 1998).
242. See id. at 1337.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 1338.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 1339.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 1340.
254. See id.
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proach the Dialogue without colliding.255 The yacht was
swinging wildly on the anchor chain. The coxswain of the
lifeboat told Korpi to cut his anchor line, which would calm
the swinging of the yacht and allow the lifeboat to ap-
proach. 56 The crew of the lifeboat tossed him a heaving line
to which a towing line was attached.257 Though he caught
the heaving line, he was unable to pull the towing line
aboard. He was too tired from lack of sleep and from bat-
tling the storm.258 He tied the heaving line to his bow
cleat.259 Afraid of the rocks only forty-four feet away, the
coxswain of the lifeboat began towing the Dialog6ue, hoping
that the thin heaving line would not part. It did.60 The Dia-
logue smashed against the rocks.261 A Coast Guard rescue
helicopter, which had been circling the area, swept in and
scooped Korpi from the water. It deposited him on the
nearby shore.262 The Dialogue was destroyed.263
Korpi sued the United States for the alleged negligence
of the Coast Guard in its rescue attempt.2 4 The parties
agreed to a bench trial.26 5 Korpi lost.266 As Chief Magistrate
Judge Langford said, "The fact is, thanks to the Coast
Guard, Mr. Korpi is alive, he suffered only minor injuries,
and he is very lucky that they got to him as quickly as theydid. ,267
What is most important about this decision, however, is
that it reaffirms, in no uncertain terms, the common law
prohibition of affirmative duties, despite a statute to the
contrary:
A private party has no affirmative duty to rescue a vessel or per-
255. See id. at 1343.
256. See id. at 1344.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 1345.
259. See id. The full story of this fiasco is even more pathetic. At some point
during the rescue, Korpi's eyeglasses were lost, rendering him almost blind. See
id. at 1337-38. Even if the weather had improved, he could not have reached
port safely-he could not see where he was going. This case could be used as a
primer on what to avoid when sailing alone.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 1337.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 1350.
267. Id. at 1348.
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268
son in distress. The Coast Guard therefore, also has no affirma-
tive duty to render aid to a vessel or person in distress .... The
Coast Guard is not held to any higher standard of care in its res-
cue operations than a private person .... Although the Coast
Guard is under no affirmative duty to render aid to a person or
vessel on the high seas,... once having done so, it is held to the
same standard of care as private persons.269
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with
Judge Langford. In a memorandum opinion, the Court
wrote, "In a case of rescue at sea, 'a rescuer will be held li-
able only (1) for negligent conduct that worsens the position
of the victim or (2) for reckless and wanton conduct in per-
forming the rescue.' ,,7 That leaves the rescuer who does
nothing for the victim absolved of any responsibility, in
open derogation of the statute imposing a criminal penalty
on his refusal to help.
The court's conclusion in Korpi sounds chillingly like
the words of a British admiralty court opinion from 1908,
two years before the Brussels Convention on Salvage:
This moral obligation applies on land as well as on sea, and its
force as a moral obligation is only greater in the case of sea perils
because these are in the general case more claimant in their call
for aid because of their exceptionally dangerous character. But
this is an obligation which applies not to seafaring matters only,
but to all circumstances in which the citizen can by timely assis-
tance save others from danger; even that obligation can hardly be
held to exist as regards saving of corporeal objects. It applies only
to persons. But whatever be the extent of it, it is plainly not an obli-
gation in law. Its non-fulfillment cannot be visited with either pub-
lic official censure or give claim in civil suit in respect of failure. 27'
The Brussels Salvage Convention and the Salvage Act
of 1912 were meant to make rescue an obligation in law.
But as the Ninth Circuit makes clear in Korpi, our law is
268. Id. at 1346 (citing Basic Boats, Inc. v. U.S., 352 F.Supp 44, 48 (E.D.Va.
1972); Lacey v. U.S., 98 F.Supp. 219, 220 (D. Mass.1951); Frank v. U.S., 250
F.2d 178, 180 (3d Cir. 1957); Bunting v. U.S., 884 F.2d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir.
1989)).
269. Id. (citations omitted).
270. Korpi v. United States, 145 F.3d 1338, No. 97-15704, 1998 WL 231207,
at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 1998) (quoting Berg v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 759 F.2d
1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1985)).
271. Clam Steam Trawling Co. v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing
Co., 1908 S.C. 651, 657 (emphasis added).
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the same as it was in 1908. There is no duty to rescue those
in danger at sea.
CONCLUSION
Thomas Babington Macaulay, a member of the 1837
commission responsible for revising the Indian Penal Code,
was one of the first to recognize that there were problems
with enforcing positive duties generally and Good Samari-
tanism in particular. Macaulay wrote:
It is true that none but a very depraved man would suffer an-
other to be drowned when he might prevent it with a word. But
if we punish such a man, where are we to stop? How much exer-
tion are we to require? Is a person to be a murderer if he does
not go fifty yards through the sun of Bengal at noon in May in
order to caution a traveler against a swollen river?
2 7
2
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. once said that "hard cases
make bad law."273 No one can argue that what happened to
the greatest ship afloat in the icy waters of the North At-
lantic on the night of April 15, 1912, was a hard case. Does
that make the law that followed the sinking of the Titanic a
bad law? Is it wrong to have a legal duty to help those in
need, when such aid could be easily given?
Macaulay's objection is a real one. Where are we to
draw the line? The Supreme Court tried to draw a line with
Indian Towing: a duty once assumed must be continued.
But that has led to a flood of lawsuits against the Coast
Guard, and it has prompted the courts to deny any duty
owed to anyone whatsoever. That seems especially unfortu-
nate in light of a statute to the contrary.
Another objection, and perhaps the most important, is
the lack of an historical tradition in this country (and in
England) for this sort of imposition of duty. The attempt by
the Salvage Commission to graft this idea onto limbs of
American jurisprudence was bound to fail. We are too de-
voted to the common law and too zealous in defense of our
liberty to allow this foreign concept to flower here.2"
272. GOODMAN, supra note 45, at 102.
273. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904).
274. Witness the outcry over laws requiring seatbelts, airbags, bicycle hel-
mets, and other restrictions on our "freedom." Even the celebrated final episode
of Seinfeld ridiculed a Good Samaritan law.
2000] 625
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
That may not be all bad. One of the first Good Samari-
tan laws was passed in France in 1941 under less than no-
ble circumstances. 275 A German officer had been shot by the
Resistance. 276 His cries for help as he lay in the street went
unanswered, and he died from his wounds. 77 In reprisal,
the Germans took fifty hostages from the village and exe-
cuted them.2 The Vichy government then passed a statute
obliging citizens to intervene for the prevention of crimes
and the rescue of persons in danger.2 ' The rule tended to
protect the Nazis by punishing those who did not come to
their aid.8 °
The answer may not be to impose a duty by fiat, but an
answer must be found. This problem of rescue is not merely
an academic question. In 1989, 160 Vietnamese refugees,
crowded onto a tiny boat, floated into the shipping lanes in
the South China Sea.28' As the huge Nissei Maru tanker
slowed to avoid collision and to offer help, the refugees' boat
caught the wake of the 484,000-ton ship and capsized.282
The tanker called for help from the three other ships
standing within sight of the accident. 283 Not one responded,
and over 130 people, mostly women and children, lost their
lives.2 It was said that ship owners told their captains who
crossed the South China Sea not to pick up refugees, be-
cause of the additional costs and administrative head-
aches.285
275. See Andre Tune, The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan, in THE GOOD
SAMARITAN AND THE LAw 46 (James M. Ratcliffe, ed., 1966).
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. It is interesting to note that this law is still on the book in France.
There was some movement to charge the paparazzi for its violation following
the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. The paparazzi were alleged to have al-
lowed Diana and the other passengers to die while they snapped photographs.
To date, no charges against the photographers have been filed. See generally
Talk of the Nation: Good Samaritan Laws (National Public Radio broadcast,
October 10, 1998).
281. See David E. Sanger, Japanese Say 3 Ships Refused to Aid Boat People,
N.Y. TamEs, Mar. 24, 1989, at A6.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See Henry Kamm, More Ships Ignoring Vietnam's Refugees, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 25, 1977, at A7. One captain, Edgar Silverio, worried that he might
lose his job because he stopped to pick up refugees. His owners praised him for
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Perhaps the answer may be found in the actions of the
United States Navy. Captain Alexander G. Balian, com-
mander of the U.S.S. Dubugue, encountered a similar
boatload of refugees in the South China Sea.2 6 He offered
them food and medicine but refused to take them on
board.2" Later, fifty-eight of the 110 refugees died of starva-
tion and dehydration after drifting at sea for more than a
month.288 No criminal charges were filed against Captain
Balian, and he did not face court martial.289 Instead, he was
relieved of his command. Losing one's ship is considered the
Navy's worst ignominy, and it ended Captain Balian's ca-
reer. From that incident on, there have been no accusations
of U.S. Navy ships ignoring the needs of refugees lost at
sea.
People die at sea for want of a Good Samaritan. There
is no evidence, however, that the statute encourages cap-
tains to rescue those in danger. On the contrary, there is
evidence that the law is not obeyed. There is also evidence
that the law is not enforced. A law that is not enforced is
worse than no law at all. It cannot be relied upon, and it
will not be obeyed.
We should not expect the law to save those in peril on
the seas. As Justice Holmes said,
If you want to know the law and nothing else you must look at it
as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which
such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who
finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of
it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
290
The law cannot be the foundation of our morality.
In the middle of the ocean, there are no courts, there
are no judges, and there are no juries. In the middle of the
ocean, there is no law. There is only the internal tribunal of
conscience, and it is there that we must find the duty to
his altruism, but told him not to let it happen again. See Henry Kamm, Captain
Who Saved 49 Vietnamese Fears for Job, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1978, at A3.
286. See John Cushman, Jr., Skipper Rejected Help With Refugees, Navy
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1988, at A3.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See David E. Sanger, Navy Removes Captain Over Japan Shelling, N.Y.
TImEs, Nov. 22, 1988, at A5.
290. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459
(1897).
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rescue those in danger of being lost at sea. As Maimonides
said, "[I]f one destroys the life of a single [person], it is re-
garded as though he destroyed the whole world, and if one
preserves the life of a single [person], it is regarded as
though he preserved the whole world.""1
291. MAIMONIDES, THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, THE BOOK OF TORTS 198 (Hy-
man Klein M.A. trans., 1954).
628 [Vol. 48
